Files
CST-agent/src/sandbox_exec.c
T
WHC 41c7e04940 ci: cancel stuck runs; cap ASan wall time; silence path snprintf warning
The sanitizers job wedged the only runner by printing AddressSanitizer
DEADLYSIGNAL forever (Docker without SYS_PTRACE). Concurrency now cancels
in-progress jobs on a new push, and make asan is wrapped in timeout -s KILL
480 with shallow ASAN_OPTIONS.

Also copy the path with memcpy after the length check so -O1 asan builds
do not warn about snprintf truncation into OS_PATH_MAX.
2026-10-07 01:55:51 +08:00

1467 lines
41 KiB
C

#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
#include "cst_sandbox.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(__ANDROID__)
#define CST_HAVE_LANDLOCK 1
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#elif defined(__APPLE__)
#define CST_HAVE_SEATBELT 1
#include <stdint.h>
#elif defined(_WIN32)
#include <windows.h>
#include <sddl.h>
#endif
#if defined(__linux__) && (defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__aarch64__))
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF) && defined(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV) && \
defined(SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER)
#define CST_HAVE_SECCOMP 1
#endif
#endif
static int g_kind = -1;
static int g_abi;
/* --- Linux: Landlock ------------------------------------------------------ */
#ifdef CST_HAVE_LANDLOCK
/* Defined here so older kernel headers still build. */
#ifndef __NR_landlock_create_ruleset
#define __NR_landlock_create_ruleset 444
#endif
#ifndef __NR_landlock_add_rule
#define __NR_landlock_add_rule 445
#endif
#ifndef __NR_landlock_restrict_self
#define __NR_landlock_restrict_self 446
#endif
#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
#endif
#define LL_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION (1U << 0)
#define LL_RULE_PATH_BENEATH 1
#define LL_FS_EXECUTE (1ULL << 0)
#define LL_FS_WRITE_FILE (1ULL << 1)
#define LL_FS_READ_FILE (1ULL << 2)
#define LL_FS_READ_DIR (1ULL << 3)
#define LL_FS_REMOVE_DIR (1ULL << 4)
#define LL_FS_REMOVE_FILE (1ULL << 5)
#define LL_FS_MAKE_CHAR (1ULL << 6)
#define LL_FS_MAKE_DIR (1ULL << 7)
#define LL_FS_MAKE_REG (1ULL << 8)
#define LL_FS_MAKE_SOCK (1ULL << 9)
#define LL_FS_MAKE_FIFO (1ULL << 10)
#define LL_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11)
#define LL_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12)
#define LL_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13) /* ABI 2 */
#define LL_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14) /* ABI 3 */
#define LL_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0) /* ABI 4 */
#define LL_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1) /* ABI 4 */
struct ll_ruleset_attr {
uint64_t handled_access_fs;
uint64_t handled_access_net;
};
struct ll_path_beneath_attr {
uint64_t allowed_access;
int32_t parent_fd;
} __attribute__((packed));
static int ll_abi(void) {
long v = syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, NULL, 0,
LL_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
return v > 0 ? (int)v : 0;
}
/* Only write-type rights are handled, so reading and exec stay allowed
* everywhere; the rules grant them back beneath the writable roots. */
static uint64_t ll_write_rights(int abi) {
uint64_t r = LL_FS_WRITE_FILE | LL_FS_REMOVE_DIR | LL_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
LL_FS_MAKE_CHAR | LL_FS_MAKE_DIR | LL_FS_MAKE_REG |
LL_FS_MAKE_SOCK | LL_FS_MAKE_FIFO | LL_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
LL_FS_MAKE_SYM;
if (abi >= 2)
r |= LL_FS_REFER;
if (abi >= 3)
r |= LL_FS_TRUNCATE;
return r;
}
static int ll_allow(int ruleset, const char *path, uint64_t rights,
int is_dir) {
int fd = open(path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC | (is_dir ? O_DIRECTORY : 0));
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
struct ll_path_beneath_attr pb;
pb.allowed_access = rights;
pb.parent_fd = fd;
long rc = syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset, LL_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, &pb,
0);
close(fd);
return rc == 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
static int ll_prepare(const char *ws, const char *tmp, cst_sandbox_plan_t *p) {
int abi = g_abi;
struct ll_ruleset_attr attr;
memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr));
attr.handled_access_fs = ll_write_rights(abi);
if (abi >= 4)
attr.handled_access_net = LL_NET_BIND_TCP | LL_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
int fd = (int)syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, &attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
uint64_t dir_rights = attr.handled_access_fs;
uint64_t dev_rights = LL_FS_WRITE_FILE | (abi >= 3 ? LL_FS_TRUNCATE : 0);
if (ll_allow(fd, ws, dir_rights, 1) != 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
if (tmp && tmp[0])
ll_allow(fd, tmp, dir_rights, 1); /* best effort: may not exist */
ll_allow(fd, "/dev/null", dev_rights, 0);
ll_allow(fd, "/dev/tty", dev_rights, 0);
p->ruleset_fd = fd;
return 0;
}
#endif /* CST_HAVE_LANDLOCK */
/* --- macOS: Seatbelt ------------------------------------------------------ */
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SEATBELT
/* Deprecated but still shipped; declared here to avoid the warning. */
extern int sandbox_init(const char *profile, uint64_t flags, char **errorbuf);
extern void sandbox_free_error(char *errorbuf);
static void sb_quote(char *out, size_t sz, const char *s) {
size_t o = 0;
for (; *s && o + 3 < sz; s++) {
if (*s == '"' || *s == '\\')
out[o++] = '\\';
out[o++] = *s;
}
out[o] = 0;
}
static int sb_prepare(const char *ws, const char *tmp, cst_sandbox_plan_t *p) {
char rws[OS_PATH_MAX], rtmp[OS_PATH_MAX];
char qws[2 * OS_PATH_MAX], qtmp[2 * OS_PATH_MAX];
if (os_realpath(ws, rws, sizeof(rws)) != 0)
return -1;
if (!tmp || os_realpath(tmp, rtmp, sizeof(rtmp)) != 0)
snprintf(rtmp, sizeof(rtmp), "/private/tmp");
sb_quote(qws, sizeof(qws), rws);
sb_quote(qtmp, sizeof(qtmp), rtmp);
size_t n = strlen(qws) + strlen(qtmp) + 512;
p->profile = malloc(n);
if (!p->profile)
return -1;
snprintf(p->profile, n,
"(version 1)(allow default)(deny file-write*)"
"(allow file-write* (subpath \"%s\") (subpath \"%s\") "
"(literal \"/dev/null\") (literal \"/dev/tty\") "
"(literal \"/dev/dtracehelper\"))"
"(deny network*)",
qws, qtmp);
return 0;
}
#endif /* CST_HAVE_SEATBELT */
/* --- Linux: seccomp user-notify ------------------------------------------- */
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SECCOMP
#ifndef __NR_seccomp
#if defined(__x86_64__)
#define __NR_seccomp 317
#else
#define __NR_seccomp 277
#endif
#endif
#ifndef __NR_openat2
#define __NR_openat2 437
#endif
#ifndef __NR_fchmodat2
#define __NR_fchmodat2 452
#endif
#ifndef __NR_io_uring_setup
#define __NR_io_uring_setup 425
#endif
#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
#endif
#ifndef SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE
#define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE (1UL << 0)
#endif
#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
#endif
#ifndef AT_EMPTY_PATH
#define AT_EMPTY_PATH 0x1000
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__)
#define SC_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
#else
#define SC_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
#endif
#define SC_WRITE_FLAGS (O_WRONLY | O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC)
#define SC_PROG_MAX 160
typedef struct {
struct sock_filter f[SC_PROG_MAX];
unsigned short n;
} sc_prog_t;
typedef struct {
sc_prog_t prog;
int sock[2]; /* the child sends its listener fd on [1] */
int stop[2]; /* release wakes the supervisor through [1] */
pthread_t th;
int started;
char ws[OS_PATH_MAX];
char tmp[OS_PATH_MAX];
} sc_state_t;
static void sc_emit(sc_prog_t *p, uint16_t code, uint8_t jt, uint8_t jf,
uint32_t k) {
if (p->n < SC_PROG_MAX) {
struct sock_filter ins = {code, jt, jf, k};
p->f[p->n++] = ins;
}
}
#define SC_LD(off) sc_emit(p, BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, 0, 0, (uint32_t)(off))
#define SC_RET(k) sc_emit(p, BPF_RET | BPF_K, 0, 0, (uint32_t)(k))
#define SC_JEQ(k, jt, jf) \
sc_emit(p, BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, jt, jf, (uint32_t)(k))
#define SC_JSET(k, jt, jf) \
sc_emit(p, BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K, jt, jf, (uint32_t)(k))
#define SC_ARG(i) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args) + (i) * sizeof(uint64_t))
/* Syscalls whose path arguments the supervisor always checks. */
static const int SC_NOTIFY[] = {
__NR_openat2, __NR_mkdirat, __NR_mknodat, __NR_unlinkat,
__NR_symlinkat, __NR_linkat, __NR_renameat2, __NR_truncate,
__NR_fchmodat, __NR_fchmodat2, __NR_fchownat, __NR_utimensat,
__NR_setxattr, __NR_lsetxattr, __NR_removexattr, __NR_lremovexattr,
#ifdef __NR_renameat
__NR_renameat,
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__)
__NR_creat, __NR_mkdir, __NR_mknod, __NR_rmdir,
__NR_unlink, __NR_rename, __NR_link, __NR_symlink,
__NR_chmod, __NR_chown, __NR_lchown, __NR_utime,
__NR_utimes, __NR_futimesat,
#endif
};
/* Foreign ABIs are refused, IPv4/IPv6 sockets fail with EACCES, opens
* without write flags pass untouched, write-type calls go to the
* supervisor. */
static void sc_build(sc_prog_t *p) {
p->n = 0;
SC_LD(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch));
SC_JEQ(SC_ARCH, 1, 0);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM);
SC_LD(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr));
#if defined(__x86_64__)
sc_emit(p, BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K, 0, 1, 0x40000000U); /* x32 */
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM);
#endif
SC_JEQ(__NR_socket, 0, 5);
SC_LD(SC_ARG(0));
SC_JEQ(AF_INET, 2, 0);
SC_JEQ(AF_INET6, 1, 0);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EACCES);
SC_JEQ(__NR_io_uring_setup, 0, 1);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM);
SC_JEQ(__NR_openat, 0, 4);
SC_LD(SC_ARG(2));
SC_JSET(SC_WRITE_FLAGS, 1, 0);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF);
#if defined(__x86_64__)
SC_JEQ(__NR_open, 0, 4);
SC_LD(SC_ARG(1));
SC_JSET(SC_WRITE_FLAGS, 1, 0);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF);
#endif
size_t n = sizeof(SC_NOTIFY) / sizeof(SC_NOTIFY[0]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
SC_JEQ(SC_NOTIFY[i], (uint8_t)(n - i), 0);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF);
}
static int sc_send_fd(int s, int fd) {
char c = 0;
union {
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
struct cmsghdr align;
} u;
struct iovec io = {&c, 1};
struct msghdr m;
memset(&m, 0, sizeof(m));
memset(&u, 0, sizeof(u));
m.msg_iov = &io;
m.msg_iovlen = 1;
m.msg_control = u.buf;
m.msg_controllen = sizeof(u.buf);
struct cmsghdr *h = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&m);
h->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
h->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
h->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(h), &fd, sizeof(int));
return sendmsg(s, &m, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
}
static int sc_recv_fd(int s) {
char c;
union {
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
struct cmsghdr align;
} u;
struct iovec io = {&c, 1};
struct msghdr m;
memset(&m, 0, sizeof(m));
m.msg_iov = &io;
m.msg_iovlen = 1;
m.msg_control = u.buf;
m.msg_controllen = sizeof(u.buf);
if (recvmsg(s, &m, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) != 1)
return -1;
struct cmsghdr *h = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&m);
if (!h || h->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || h->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
return -1;
int fd;
memcpy(&fd, CMSG_DATA(h), sizeof(int));
return fd;
}
/* Reads child memory one page at a time (a range may end at a hole). */
static ssize_t sc_peek(int pid, uint64_t addr, void *out, size_t n) {
struct iovec l = {out, n}, r = {(void *)(uintptr_t)addr, n};
ssize_t k = process_vm_readv(pid, &l, 1, &r, 1, 0);
if (k > 0)
return k;
char mp[64];
snprintf(mp, sizeof(mp), "/proc/%d/mem", pid);
int fd = open(mp, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
k = pread(fd, out, n, (off_t)addr);
close(fd);
return k;
}
/* Path decisions need sc_peek on the sandboxed child. Yama
* kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2 (and no CAP_SYS_PTRACE) denies that, so a
* listener-only probe would report seccomp available while every write
* fails with EACCES. */
static int sc_can_peek(void) {
static const char want[] = "cst-peek-ok";
int sp[2];
if (pipe2(sp, O_CLOEXEC) != 0)
return 0;
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
char marker[] = "cst-peek-ok";
uint64_t addr = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)marker;
close(sp[0]);
if (write(sp[1], &addr, sizeof(addr)) != (ssize_t)sizeof(addr))
_exit(1);
close(sp[1]);
pause();
_exit(0);
}
close(sp[1]);
if (pid < 0) {
close(sp[0]);
return 0;
}
uint64_t addr = 0;
int ok = 0;
if (read(sp[0], &addr, sizeof(addr)) == (ssize_t)sizeof(addr) && addr) {
char got[sizeof(want)];
if (sc_peek((int)pid, addr, got, sizeof(got)) == (ssize_t)sizeof(got) &&
memcmp(got, want, sizeof(got)) == 0)
ok = 1;
}
close(sp[0]);
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
int st = 0;
while (waitpid(pid, &st, 0) < 0 && errno == EINTR)
;
return ok;
}
static int sc_read_mem(int pid, uint64_t addr, void *out, size_t n) {
size_t got = 0;
while (got < n) {
uint64_t a = addr + got;
size_t chunk = 4096 - (size_t)(a & 4095);
if (chunk > n - got)
chunk = n - got;
ssize_t k = sc_peek(pid, a, (char *)out + got, chunk);
if (k <= 0)
return -1;
got += (size_t)k;
}
return 0;
}
static int sc_read_str(int pid, uint64_t addr, char *out, size_t n) {
size_t got = 0;
while (got + 1 < n) {
uint64_t a = addr + got;
size_t chunk = 4096 - (size_t)(a & 4095);
if (chunk > n - 1 - got)
chunk = n - 1 - got;
ssize_t k = sc_peek(pid, a, out + got, chunk);
if (k <= 0)
return -1;
if (memchr(out + got, 0, (size_t)k))
return 0;
got += (size_t)k;
}
return -1;
}
static int sc_readlink(const char *link, char *out, size_t n) {
ssize_t k = readlink(link, out, n - 1);
if (k < 0)
return -1;
out[k] = 0;
return 0;
}
/* strict: the root itself does not count (it may not be removed). */
static int sc_under(const char *root, const char *p, int strict) {
size_t n = strlen(root);
if (n == 0)
return 0;
if (n == 1 && root[0] == '/')
return p[0] == '/' && (!strict || p[1]);
if (strncmp(p, root, n) != 0)
return 0;
if (p[n] == 0)
return !strict;
return p[n] == '/';
}
static int sc_inside(const sc_state_t *s, const char *p, int strict) {
static const char *const DEV[] = {"/dev/null", "/dev/zero", "/dev/full",
"/dev/tty", "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/random",
"/dev/urandom"};
if (sc_under(s->ws, p, strict) || sc_under(s->tmp, p, strict))
return 1;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(DEV) / sizeof(DEV[0]); i++)
if (strcmp(p, DEV[i]) == 0)
return 1;
return strncmp(p, "/dev/pts/", 9) == 0;
}
/* The file behind fd (or the cwd for AT_FDCWD). Pipes, sockets and other
* anonymous files are fine; unreadable links are refused. */
static int sc_fd_ok(const sc_state_t *s, int pid, int fd, int strict) {
char link[64], tgt[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (fd == AT_FDCWD)
snprintf(link, sizeof(link), "/proc/%d/cwd", pid);
else
snprintf(link, sizeof(link), "/proc/%d/fd/%d", pid, fd);
if (sc_readlink(link, tgt, sizeof(tgt)) != 0)
return 0;
return tgt[0] != '/' || sc_inside(s, tgt, strict);
}
static int sc_digits(const char **q) {
const char *p = *q;
while (**q >= '0' && **q <= '9')
(*q)++;
return *q > p;
}
/* /proc/N/fd/M or /proc/N/task/T/fd/M */
static int sc_is_fd_link(const char *p) {
if (strncmp(p, "/proc/", 6) != 0)
return 0;
p += 6;
if (!sc_digits(&p))
return 0;
if (strncmp(p, "/task/", 6) == 0) {
p += 6;
if (!sc_digits(&p))
return 0;
}
if (strncmp(p, "/fd/", 4) != 0)
return 0;
p += 4;
return sc_digits(&p) && *p == 0;
}
/* /proc/self, /dev/fd and /dev/std* name the supervisor when it resolves
* them, so they are rewritten to the task first. */
static void sc_rewrite(int pid, const char *in, char *out, size_t n) {
static const char *const STD[] = {"/dev/stdin", "/dev/stdout",
"/dev/stderr"};
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (strcmp(in, STD[i]) == 0) {
snprintf(out, n, "/proc/%d/fd/%d", pid, i);
return;
}
if (strncmp(in, "/dev/fd/", 8) == 0) {
snprintf(out, n, "/proc/%d/fd/%s", pid, in + 8);
return;
}
static const char *const SELF[] = {"/proc/self", "/proc/thread-self"};
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
size_t k = strlen(SELF[i]);
if (strncmp(in, SELF[i], k) == 0 && (in[k] == 0 || in[k] == '/')) {
snprintf(out, n, "/proc/%d%s", pid, in + k);
return;
}
}
snprintf(out, n, "%s", in);
}
/* full: absolute path as the task sees it. follow: the call follows a
* symlink in the last component. */
static int sc_abs_ok(const sc_state_t *s, const char *full, int follow,
int strict) {
char path[OS_PATH_MAX], real[OS_PATH_MAX], loc[2 * OS_PATH_MAX + 2];
size_t flen = strlen(full);
if (flen >= sizeof(path))
return 0;
memcpy(path, full, flen + 1);
size_t n = strlen(path);
while (n > 1 && path[n - 1] == '/')
path[--n] = 0;
char *slash = strrchr(path, '/');
if (!slash)
return 0;
const char *base = slash + 1;
if (!*base || strcmp(base, ".") == 0 || strcmp(base, "..") == 0) {
if (!realpath(path, real))
return errno != ENAMETOOLONG;
return sc_inside(s, real, strict);
}
if (slash == path) {
real[0] = 0;
} else {
*slash = 0;
/* a missing or unreadable parent fails the same way in the kernel */
if (!realpath(path, real))
return errno == ENOENT || errno == ENOTDIR || errno == EACCES ||
errno == ELOOP;
if (strcmp(real, "/") == 0)
real[0] = 0;
}
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%s/%s", real, base);
if (strlen(loc) >= OS_PATH_MAX)
return 0;
if (sc_is_fd_link(loc)) {
char tgt[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (sc_readlink(loc, tgt, sizeof(tgt)) != 0)
return 0;
return tgt[0] != '/' || sc_inside(s, tgt, 0);
}
if (follow) {
struct stat st;
if (lstat(loc, &st) == 0 && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
if (!realpath(loc, real))
return 0; /* dangling: following it would create the target */
return sc_inside(s, real, strict);
}
}
return sc_inside(s, loc, strict);
}
/* One (dirfd, path) argument pair. addr 0 (or "" with AT_EMPTY_PATH)
* means the call acts on dirfd itself. */
static int sc_path_ok(const sc_state_t *s, int pid, int dirfd, uint64_t addr,
int follow, int empty_ok, int strict) {
char rel[OS_PATH_MAX], base[OS_PATH_MAX], full[2 * OS_PATH_MAX];
if (addr == 0)
return sc_fd_ok(s, pid, dirfd, strict);
if (sc_read_str(pid, addr, rel, sizeof(rel)) != 0)
return 0;
if (!rel[0])
return empty_ok ? sc_fd_ok(s, pid, dirfd, strict) : 1;
if (rel[0] == '/') {
sc_rewrite(pid, rel, full, sizeof(full));
} else {
char link[64];
if (dirfd == AT_FDCWD)
snprintf(link, sizeof(link), "/proc/%d/cwd", pid);
else
snprintf(link, sizeof(link), "/proc/%d/fd/%d", pid, dirfd);
if (sc_readlink(link, base, sizeof(base)) != 0 || base[0] != '/')
return 0;
snprintf(full, sizeof(full), "%s/%s", base, rel);
}
return sc_abs_ok(s, full, follow, strict);
}
/* 1: let the call run, 0: fail it with EACCES. */
static int sc_decide(const sc_state_t *s, const struct seccomp_notif *req) {
const uint64_t *a = (const uint64_t *)req->data.args;
int pid = (int)req->pid;
#define SC_P(d, p, fl, em, st) \
sc_path_ok(s, pid, (int)(d), (p), (fl), (em), (st))
switch (req->data.nr) {
case __NR_openat: {
int fl = (int)a[2];
return !(fl & SC_WRITE_FLAGS) || SC_P(a[0], a[1], !(fl & O_NOFOLLOW), 0, 0);
}
case __NR_openat2: {
struct {
uint64_t flags, mode, resolve;
} how;
memset(&how, 0, sizeof(how));
size_t sz = a[3] < sizeof(how) ? (size_t)a[3] : sizeof(how);
if (sz < sizeof(uint64_t) || sc_read_mem(pid, a[2], &how, sz) != 0)
return 0;
if (!(how.flags & SC_WRITE_FLAGS))
return 1;
return SC_P(a[0], a[1],
!(how.flags & O_NOFOLLOW) && !(how.resolve & 0x04 /* NO_SYMLINKS */),
0, 0);
}
case __NR_mkdirat:
case __NR_mknodat:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], 0, 0, 0);
case __NR_unlinkat:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], 0, 0, 1);
case __NR_symlinkat:
return SC_P(a[1], a[2], 0, 0, 0);
case __NR_linkat:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], (a[4] & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) != 0,
(a[4] & AT_EMPTY_PATH) != 0, 0) &&
SC_P(a[2], a[3], 0, 0, 0);
#ifdef __NR_renameat
case __NR_renameat:
#endif
case __NR_renameat2:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], 0, 0, 1) && SC_P(a[2], a[3], 0, 0, 1);
case __NR_truncate:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 1, 0, 0);
case __NR_fchmodat:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], 1, 0, 0);
case __NR_fchmodat2:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], !(a[3] & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW),
(a[3] & AT_EMPTY_PATH) != 0, 0);
case __NR_fchownat:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], !(a[4] & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW),
(a[4] & AT_EMPTY_PATH) != 0, 0);
case __NR_utimensat:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], !(a[3] & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW), 0, 0);
case __NR_setxattr:
case __NR_removexattr:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 1, 0, 0);
case __NR_lsetxattr:
case __NR_lremovexattr:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 0, 0, 0);
#if defined(__x86_64__)
case __NR_open: {
int fl = (int)a[1];
return !(fl & SC_WRITE_FLAGS) ||
SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], !(fl & O_NOFOLLOW), 0, 0);
}
case __NR_creat:
case __NR_chmod:
case __NR_chown:
case __NR_utime:
case __NR_utimes:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 1, 0, 0);
case __NR_mkdir:
case __NR_mknod:
case __NR_lchown:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 0, 0, 0);
case __NR_rmdir:
case __NR_unlink:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 0, 0, 1);
case __NR_rename:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 0, 0, 1) && SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[1], 0, 0, 1);
case __NR_link:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[0], 0, 0, 0) && SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[1], 0, 0, 0);
case __NR_symlink:
return SC_P(AT_FDCWD, a[1], 0, 0, 0);
case __NR_futimesat:
return SC_P(a[0], a[1], 1, 0, 0);
#endif
default:
return 0;
}
#undef SC_P
}
static void sc_handle(const sc_state_t *s, int lfd) {
struct seccomp_notif req;
struct seccomp_notif_resp resp;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
if (ioctl(lfd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req) != 0)
return; /* the task died meanwhile */
int allow = sc_decide(s, &req);
/* the pid read above still names the task that made the call */
if (ioctl(lfd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req.id) != 0)
return;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
resp.id = req.id;
if (allow)
resp.flags = SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE;
else
resp.error = -EACCES;
ioctl(lfd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp);
}
/* Waits for the listener fd, then answers until no task uses the filter
* or release() asks to stop. Tasks left over after that get ENOSYS from
* the kernel for checked calls. */
static void *sc_main(void *arg) {
sc_state_t *s = arg;
int lfd = -1;
for (;;) {
struct pollfd pf[2] = {{s->sock[0], POLLIN, 0}, {s->stop[0], POLLIN, 0}};
if (poll(pf, 2, -1) < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
return NULL;
}
if (pf[1].revents)
return NULL;
if (pf[0].revents) {
lfd = sc_recv_fd(s->sock[0]);
break;
}
}
if (lfd < 0)
return NULL;
for (;;) {
struct pollfd pf[2] = {{lfd, POLLIN, 0}, {s->stop[0], POLLIN, 0}};
if (poll(pf, 2, -1) < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
break;
}
if (pf[0].revents & POLLIN) {
sc_handle(s, lfd);
continue;
}
if (pf[0].revents || pf[1].revents)
break;
}
close(lfd);
return NULL;
}
static void sc_free(sc_state_t *s) {
if (!s)
return;
if (s->started) {
char c = 1;
ssize_t w = write(s->stop[1], &c, 1);
(void)w;
pthread_join(s->th, NULL);
}
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (s->sock[i] >= 0)
close(s->sock[i]);
if (s->stop[i] >= 0)
close(s->stop[i]);
}
free(s);
}
static int sc_prepare(const char *ws, const char *tmp, cst_sandbox_plan_t *p) {
sc_state_t *s = calloc(1, sizeof(*s));
if (!s)
return -1;
s->sock[0] = s->sock[1] = s->stop[0] = s->stop[1] = -1;
if (!realpath(ws, s->ws))
goto fail;
if (!tmp || !tmp[0] || !realpath(tmp, s->tmp))
s->tmp[0] = 0;
sc_build(&s->prog);
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, s->sock) != 0 ||
pipe2(s->stop, O_CLOEXEC) != 0)
goto fail;
if (pthread_create(&s->th, NULL, sc_main, s) != 0)
goto fail;
s->started = 1;
p->sc = s;
return 0;
fail:
sc_free(s);
return -1;
}
static int sc_install(const sc_prog_t *prog, int sock) {
struct sock_fprog fp;
fp.len = prog->n;
fp.filter = (struct sock_filter *)prog->f;
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
return -1;
int lfd = (int)syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER,
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER, &fp);
if (lfd < 0)
return -1;
int rc = sc_send_fd(sock, lfd);
close(lfd);
return rc;
}
/* The whole round trip in a throwaway child: install a listener filter on
* getppid, answer it with CONTINUE (kernel 5.5+). A child killed by the
* platform's own seccomp policy only costs that child. */
static int sc_probe(void) {
sc_prog_t prog;
sc_prog_t *p = &prog;
p->n = 0;
SC_LD(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch));
SC_JEQ(SC_ARCH, 1, 0);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
SC_LD(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr));
SC_JEQ(__NR_getppid, 0, 1);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF);
SC_RET(SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
int sp[2];
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, sp) != 0)
return 0;
pid_t self = getpid();
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(sp[0]);
if (sc_install(&prog, sp[1]) != 0)
_exit(3);
_exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) == self ? 0 : 4);
}
close(sp[1]);
if (pid < 0) {
close(sp[0]);
return 0;
}
int ok = 0;
struct pollfd pf = {sp[0], POLLIN, 0};
if (poll(&pf, 1, 3000) > 0) {
int lfd = sc_recv_fd(sp[0]);
if (lfd >= 0) {
struct pollfd pl = {lfd, POLLIN, 0};
if (poll(&pl, 1, 3000) > 0 && (pl.revents & POLLIN)) {
struct seccomp_notif req;
struct seccomp_notif_resp resp;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
if (ioctl(lfd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req) == 0) {
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
resp.id = req.id;
resp.flags = SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE;
ok = ioctl(lfd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp) == 0;
}
}
close(lfd);
}
}
close(sp[0]);
if (!ok)
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
int st = 0;
while (waitpid(pid, &st, 0) < 0 && errno == EINTR)
;
return ok && WIFEXITED(st) && WEXITSTATUS(st) == 0 && sc_can_peek();
}
#endif /* CST_HAVE_SECCOMP */
/* --- Windows: Low integrity level ----------------------------------------- */
#ifdef _WIN32
#define LW_LABEL "S:(ML;OICI;NW;;;LW)"
#define LW_RECORD "sandbox-labels"
/* Same user, no admin privileges, Low IL. No LUA_TOKEN: a deny-only
* Administrators group cannot open an admin's (SSH) window station and the
* child fails in DLL init; the integrity check does not need it. */
static HANDLE lw_token(void) {
HANDLE self = NULL, tok = NULL;
if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(),
TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_ADJUST_DEFAULT |
TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY,
&self))
return NULL;
BOOL ok = CreateRestrictedToken(self, DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE, 0, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, NULL, &tok);
CloseHandle(self);
if (!ok)
return NULL;
PSID low = NULL;
if (!ConvertStringSidToSidW(L"S-1-16-4096", &low)) {
CloseHandle(tok);
return NULL;
}
TOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL tml;
memset(&tml, 0, sizeof(tml));
tml.Label.Sid = low;
tml.Label.Attributes = SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY;
ok = SetTokenInformation(tok, TokenIntegrityLevel, &tml,
(DWORD)(sizeof(tml) + GetLengthSid(low)));
LocalFree(low);
if (!ok) {
CloseHandle(tok);
return NULL;
}
return tok;
}
static int lw_record_path(char *out, size_t n) {
char dir[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (os_config_dir(dir, sizeof(dir)) != 0)
return -1;
return snprintf(out, n, "%s/%s", dir, LW_RECORD) < (int)n ? 0 : -1;
}
static char *lw_read_record(void) {
char path[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (lw_record_path(path, sizeof(path)) != 0)
return NULL;
FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
if (!f)
return NULL;
size_t cap = 4096, len = 0;
char *s = malloc(cap);
size_t k;
while (s && (k = fread(s + len, 1, cap - len - 1, f)) > 0) {
len += k;
if (cap - len < 2) {
char *g = realloc(s, cap * 2);
if (!g) {
free(s);
s = NULL;
break;
}
s = g;
cap *= 2;
}
}
fclose(f);
if (s)
s[len] = 0;
return s;
}
/* dir is a recorded directory or inside one (the label is inherited). */
static int lw_recorded(const char *dir) {
char *s = lw_read_record();
int found = 0;
for (char *line = s; line && *line && !found;) {
char *nl = strchr(line, '\n');
if (nl)
*nl = 0;
char *tab = strchr(line, '\t');
if (tab)
*tab = 0;
found = line[0] && os_path_under(line, dir);
line = nl ? nl + 1 : NULL;
}
free(s);
return found;
}
static int lw_record_add(const char *dir, const char *old_sddl) {
char path[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (lw_record_path(path, sizeof(path)) != 0)
return -1;
FILE *f = fopen(path, "ab");
if (!f)
return -1;
fprintf(f, "%s\t%s\n", dir, old_sddl);
return fclose(f) == 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
static int lw_same_dir(const char *a, const char *b) {
return a && b && a[0] && b[0] && os_path_under(a, b) && os_path_under(b, a);
}
/* An environment directory in the form os_realpath gives the workspace
* (long names, '/'), or NULL. */
static const char *lw_env_dir(const char *name, char *buf, size_t n) {
const char *v = getenv(name);
if (!v || !v[0] || os_realpath(v, buf, n) != 0)
return NULL;
os_path_norm_slashes(buf);
return buf;
}
/* Labeling a whole drive, the profile or system folders would open far more
* than a project to every sandboxed command. */
static int lw_refused(const char *dir) {
size_t n = strlen(dir);
while (n > 0 && (dir[n - 1] == '/' || dir[n - 1] == '\\'))
n--;
if (n <= 2)
return 1;
static const char *const SELF[] = {"USERPROFILE", "APPDATA",
"LOCALAPPDATA", "TEMP"};
static const char *const TREE[] = {"SystemRoot", "ProgramFiles",
"ProgramFiles(x86)", "ProgramData"};
char buf[OS_PATH_MAX];
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(SELF) / sizeof(SELF[0]); i++)
if (lw_same_dir(lw_env_dir(SELF[i], buf, sizeof(buf)), dir))
return 1;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(TREE) / sizeof(TREE[0]); i++) {
const char *v = lw_env_dir(TREE[i], buf, sizeof(buf));
if (v && os_path_under(v, dir))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int lw_prepare(const char *ws, cst_sandbox_plan_t *p) {
static int creds_done, tmp_done;
char buf[OS_PATH_MAX + 256];
if (!ws || !ws[0])
return -1;
if (!creds_done) {
/* files saved by older versions have no no-read-up label yet */
char dir[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (os_config_dir(dir, sizeof(dir)) == 0 &&
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/credentials", dir) < (int)sizeof(buf)) {
os_stat_t st;
if (os_lstat(buf, &st) != 0 || os_chmod_private(buf) == 0)
creds_done = 1;
}
}
char tmp[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (os_temp_dir(tmp, sizeof(tmp)) != 0 ||
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/cst-agent-sandbox", tmp) >=
(int)sizeof(tmp))
return -1;
memcpy(tmp, buf, strlen(buf) + 1);
if (!tmp_done) {
os_mkdir_p(tmp, 0700);
if (os_win_set_label(tmp, LW_LABEL) != 0)
return -1;
tmp_done = 1;
}
if (!lw_recorded(ws)) {
char old[512];
if (lw_refused(ws) || os_win_get_label(ws, old, sizeof(old)) != 0 ||
os_win_set_label(ws, LW_LABEL) != 0)
return -1;
lw_record_add(ws, old);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"[cst: sandbox: labeled %s Low integrity so sandboxed commands "
"can write there; /sandbox reset-labels undoes it]\n",
ws);
p->note = strdup(buf);
}
HANDLE tok = lw_token();
if (!tok) {
free(p->note);
p->note = NULL;
return -1;
}
p->token = tok;
for (char *c = tmp; *c; c++)
if (*c == '/')
*c = '\\';
p->tmpdir = strdup(tmp);
return p->tmpdir ? 0 : -1;
}
static int lw_run(const char *ws, const char *cmd, size_t max_out,
const cst_sandbox_plan_t *p, os_run_result_t *r) {
size_t tl = strlen(p->tmpdir) + 8;
char *te = malloc(tl), *tm = malloc(tl);
int rc = -1;
if (te && tm) {
snprintf(te, tl, "TEMP=%s", p->tmpdir);
snprintf(tm, tl, "TMP=%s", p->tmpdir);
const char *env[] = {te, tm, NULL};
rc = os_run_shell_token(ws, cmd, max_out, r, p->token, env);
}
free(te);
free(tm);
if (rc == 0 && p->note) {
size_t nl = strlen(p->note);
char *o = malloc(nl + r->out_len + 1);
if (o) {
memcpy(o, p->note, nl);
if (r->out)
memcpy(o + nl, r->out, r->out_len);
o[nl + r->out_len] = 0;
free(r->out);
r->out = o;
r->out_len += nl;
}
}
return rc;
}
#endif /* _WIN32 */
char *cst_sandbox_labels(void) {
#ifdef _WIN32
char *s = lw_read_record();
if (!s)
return NULL;
size_t o = 0;
for (char *line = s; *line;) {
char *nl = strchr(line, '\n');
size_t len = nl ? (size_t)(nl - line) : strlen(line);
size_t path = strcspn(line, "\t\n");
if (path) {
memmove(s + o, line, path);
o += path;
s[o++] = '\n';
}
line += len + (nl ? 1 : 0);
}
s[o] = 0;
if (!o) {
free(s);
return NULL;
}
return s;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
int cst_sandbox_reset_labels(char **report) {
if (report)
*report = NULL;
#ifdef _WIN32
char *s = lw_read_record();
size_t cap = 256, len = 0;
char *rep = malloc(cap), *keep = NULL;
size_t kcap = 0, klen = 0;
int ok = 0, bad = 0;
if (rep)
rep[0] = 0;
for (char *line = s; line && *line;) {
char *nl = strchr(line, '\n');
if (nl)
*nl = 0;
char *tab = strchr(line, '\t');
const char *old = tab ? tab + 1 : "S:";
if (tab)
*tab = 0;
if (line[0]) {
os_stat_t st;
int gone = os_lstat(line, &st) != 0;
int done = gone || os_win_set_label(line, old[0] ? old : "S:") == 0;
char msg[OS_PATH_MAX + 64];
int m = snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s %s\n",
gone ? "gone " : done ? "restored" : "FAILED ",
line);
if (m > 0 && rep) {
while (len + (size_t)m + 1 > cap) {
char *g = realloc(rep, cap *= 2);
if (!g)
break;
rep = g;
}
if (len + (size_t)m + 1 <= cap) {
memcpy(rep + len, msg, (size_t)m + 1);
len += (size_t)m;
}
}
if (done) {
ok++;
} else {
bad++;
size_t need = strlen(line) + strlen(old) + 3;
if (klen + need + 1 > kcap) {
char *g = realloc(keep, kcap = (klen + need + 1) * 2);
if (g)
keep = g;
}
if (keep && klen + need + 1 <= kcap)
klen += (size_t)snprintf(keep + klen, kcap - klen, "%s\t%s\n",
line, old);
}
}
line = nl ? nl + 1 : NULL;
}
free(s);
char path[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (lw_record_path(path, sizeof(path)) == 0) {
if (klen) {
FILE *f = fopen(path, "wb");
if (f) {
fwrite(keep, 1, klen, f);
fclose(f);
}
} else {
remove(path);
}
}
free(keep);
if (report)
*report = rep;
else
free(rep);
return bad ? -1 : ok;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
/* --- common --------------------------------------------------------------- */
int cst_sandbox_probe(void) {
if (g_kind >= 0)
return g_kind;
int kind = CST_SANDBOX_NONE;
const char *e = getenv("CST_SANDBOX");
if (e && (strcmp(e, "0") == 0 || strcmp(e, "off") == 0 ||
strcmp(e, "none") == 0)) {
g_kind = kind;
return g_kind;
}
int want_ll = !e || strcmp(e, "seccomp") != 0;
int want_sc = !e || strcmp(e, "landlock") != 0;
#ifdef CST_HAVE_LANDLOCK
if (want_ll) {
g_abi = ll_abi();
if (g_abi > 0)
kind = CST_SANDBOX_LANDLOCK;
}
#endif
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SECCOMP
if (kind == CST_SANDBOX_NONE && want_sc && sc_probe())
kind = CST_SANDBOX_SECCOMP;
#endif
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SEATBELT
kind = CST_SANDBOX_SEATBELT;
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
if (!e || strcmp(e, "lowil") == 0) {
HANDLE tok = lw_token();
if (tok) {
CloseHandle(tok);
kind = CST_SANDBOX_LOWIL;
}
}
#endif
(void)want_ll;
(void)want_sc;
g_kind = kind;
return g_kind;
}
int cst_sandbox_reprobe(void) {
g_kind = -1;
g_abi = 0;
return cst_sandbox_probe();
}
int cst_sandbox_landlock_abi(void) {
cst_sandbox_probe();
return g_abi;
}
const char *cst_sandbox_name(int kind) {
switch (kind) {
case CST_SANDBOX_LANDLOCK:
return "landlock";
case CST_SANDBOX_SEATBELT:
return "seatbelt";
case CST_SANDBOX_SECCOMP:
return "seccomp";
case CST_SANDBOX_LOWIL:
return "lowil";
default:
return "none";
}
}
int cst_sandbox_prepare(const char *workspace, const char *tmpdir,
cst_sandbox_plan_t *plan) {
memset(plan, 0, sizeof(*plan));
plan->ruleset_fd = -1;
int kind = cst_sandbox_probe();
int rc = -1;
#ifdef CST_HAVE_LANDLOCK
if (kind == CST_SANDBOX_LANDLOCK)
rc = ll_prepare(workspace, tmpdir, plan);
#endif
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SEATBELT
if (kind == CST_SANDBOX_SEATBELT)
rc = sb_prepare(workspace, tmpdir, plan);
#endif
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SECCOMP
if (kind == CST_SANDBOX_SECCOMP)
rc = sc_prepare(workspace, tmpdir, plan);
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
if (kind == CST_SANDBOX_LOWIL && (rc = lw_prepare(workspace, plan)) != 0)
cst_sandbox_release(plan);
#endif
(void)workspace;
(void)tmpdir;
plan->kind = rc == 0 ? kind : CST_SANDBOX_NONE;
return rc;
}
int cst_sandbox_enter(void *arg) {
const cst_sandbox_plan_t *p = arg;
if (!p)
return -1;
#ifdef CST_HAVE_LANDLOCK
if (p->kind == CST_SANDBOX_LANDLOCK) {
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
return -1;
return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, p->ruleset_fd, 0) == 0 ? 0
: -1;
}
#endif
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SEATBELT
if (p->kind == CST_SANDBOX_SEATBELT) {
char *err = NULL;
if (sandbox_init(p->profile, 0, &err) != 0) {
if (err)
sandbox_free_error(err);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SECCOMP
if (p->kind == CST_SANDBOX_SECCOMP && p->sc) {
const sc_state_t *s = p->sc;
return sc_install(&s->prog, s->sock[1]);
}
#endif
return -1;
}
void cst_sandbox_release(cst_sandbox_plan_t *plan) {
if (!plan)
return;
#ifdef CST_HAVE_LANDLOCK
if (plan->ruleset_fd >= 0)
close(plan->ruleset_fd);
#endif
#ifdef CST_HAVE_SECCOMP
sc_free(plan->sc);
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
if (plan->token)
CloseHandle(plan->token);
#endif
plan->token = NULL;
free(plan->tmpdir);
plan->tmpdir = NULL;
free(plan->note);
plan->note = NULL;
plan->sc = NULL;
free(plan->profile);
plan->profile = NULL;
plan->ruleset_fd = -1;
plan->kind = CST_SANDBOX_NONE;
}
int cst_sandbox_run_shell(const char *workspace, const char *cmd,
size_t max_out, os_run_result_t *r) {
char tmp[OS_PATH_MAX];
if (os_temp_dir(tmp, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
tmp[0] = 0;
cst_sandbox_plan_t plan;
if (cst_sandbox_prepare(workspace, tmp, &plan) != 0) {
memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
const char *msg = "[cst: sandbox unavailable; command not run]\n";
#ifdef _WIN32
if (workspace && !lw_recorded(workspace) && lw_refused(workspace))
msg = "[cst: sandbox: will not label a drive root, the profile or a "
"system folder writable; command not run. Start cst-agent in a "
"project folder]\n";
#endif
r->out = malloc(strlen(msg) + 1);
if (r->out) {
memcpy(r->out, msg, strlen(msg) + 1);
r->out_len = strlen(msg);
}
r->exit_code = 126;
return 0;
}
#ifdef _WIN32
int rc = lw_run(workspace, cmd, max_out, &plan, r);
#else
int rc = os_run_shell_ex(workspace, cmd, max_out, r, cst_sandbox_enter,
&plan);
#endif
cst_sandbox_release(&plan);
return rc;
}
static int has(const char *out, size_t n, const char *needle) {
size_t k = strlen(needle);
for (size_t i = 0; i + k <= n; i++)
if (memcmp(out + i, needle, k) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
int cst_sandbox_blocked(const char *out, size_t n, int exit_code) {
if (exit_code == 0 || !out)
return 0;
static const char *const SIGNS[] = {
"Permission denied", "Read-only file system", "Operation not permitted",
"EACCES", "EPERM", "EROFS",
"[cst: sandbox", "Network is unreachable",
/* curl when the socket itself was refused (seccomp) */
"Could not connect to server", "Failed to connect to",
/* localized strerror(EACCES/EPERM/EROFS) */
"权限不够", "不允许的操作", "只读文件系统", "權限不足",
"拒絕不符權限的操作", "許可がありません", "Keine Berechtigung",
"Permission non accord", "Permiso denegado", "Отказано в доступе",
/* Windows ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED from cmd, PowerShell and Win32 tools */
"Access is denied", "Access to the path", "UnauthorizedAccess",
"拒绝访问", "存取被拒", "Zugriff verweigert", "Accès refusé",
/* Cygwin/MSYS2 programs cannot initialize at Low IL */
"DLL initialization routine failed", "0xc0000142",
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(SIGNS) / sizeof(SIGNS[0]); i++)
if (has(out, n, SIGNS[i]))
return 1;
return 0;
}