77de812207a1cddac6b791b41f0693484682e153
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 WHC
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daa92a6cfb |
seccomp: require child memory peek in the availability probe
With Yama ptrace_scope=2 and no CAP_SYS_PTRACE, process_vm_readv and /proc/<pid>/mem both fail, so sc_decide cannot read path strings and every workspace write gets EACCES. The old probe only checked the USER_NOTIF round trip, so CST_SANDBOX=seccomp and the forced-seccomp test pass looked available and then failed on the first write. sc_can_peek() forks a child, places a marker on its stack, and retries the same sc_peek path. sc_probe() now needs that too, so those hosts fall back to none (or keep landlock) instead of a silent deny-all sandbox. |
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WHC
|
2a43ae6622 |
Windows: official port -- UCRT static build, UTF-8 throughout, Low IL sandbox, ncurses TUI, installer; v0.6.0
Build
* cross build switches to pkgsCross.ucrt64 (shell-win.nix); curl (Schannel),
winpthreads and ncurses 6.6 are linked statically, so the release is
cst-agent.exe + busybox.exe (busybox-w32 Unicode) with no extra DLLs
* windres embeds a manifest with activeCodePage=UTF-8 and a version resource
* ncurses 6.6 Windows console driver patches (mouse button state, A_DIM,
wide-char declarations): scripts/patches/
* scripts/bootstrap_msys2.sh builds the same release natively in MSYS2
UCRT64; PR #1's MINGW64 notes now point there
* vendor/tre-regex (musl's TRE) provides <regex.h> on MinGW
UTF-8
* paths cross the system call boundary as UTF-16 (*W APIs); console code
pages set to 65001 and restored on exit; files are read and written in
binary mode
* child output that is not valid UTF-8 is decoded from the console, OEM or
ANSI system code page
* read_file hides CR; edit_file, apply_patch and write_file keep CRLF line
endings and a UTF-8 BOM
OS layer and processes
* os_dir_* and cst_fnmatch replace the POSIX-only directory walks in
subagent, plugins, skills, undo and fs_tools; realpath / path_under and
symlink rejection work on Windows
* every child goes through CreateProcessW with its own environment block
inside a Job Object, so timeouts and Esc end the whole process tree
Sandbox (auto mode, "auto · lowil")
* run_shell runs with a restricted Low integrity token; the workspace gets
an inheritable Low label once, the sandbox TEMP is labeled Low, and the
credentials file gets a no-read-up label
* drive roots, the profile and system folders are never labeled
* network commands still ask, since Low IL does not block the network;
Access denied and MSYS2's 0xc0000142 offer a rerun outside the sandbox
* /sandbox lists labeled folders, /sandbox reset-labels restores them
TUI
* raster console fonts are switched to Consolas / NSimSun while running
* the home logo falls back to text when the console font lacks U+2580
* mouse drag copy goes to the Windows clipboard
Distribution
* scripts/install_windows.ps1 installs a Gitea release into
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\cst-agent and adds it to the user PATH;
cst-agent-update.cmd reruns it; scripts/release_windows.sh uploads the
zip with the token taken from the environment
* scripts/run_windows.bat is gone; docs/README-windows.md is rewritten
Tests
* new test_lowil, test_win_utf8 and test_os_dir; tests made portable
(cst_test_util.h)
* scripts/win_test.sh and scripts/winvm/ run the suite on English and
Chinese Windows Server VMs as Administrator, a standard user and a
Chinese user name: 29/29 on all six
|
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WHC
|
8efd63bb31 |
Sandbox: seccomp user-notify fallback for Termux and kernels without Landlock
- Child installs a seccomp filter with a listener; a supervisor thread resolves the path of write-type syscalls (cwd, dirfd, .., symlinks, /proc/self, /dev/stdout, both ends of rename/link) and answers CONTINUE or EACCES; IPv4/IPv6 sockets are refused - Probe order Landlock -> seccomp -> none, checked in a throwaway child; CST_SANDBOX=landlock|seccomp|off - curl connect failures count as sandbox refusals - test_sandbox runs the detected sandbox and forced seccomp, with escape, symlink, rename, link, chmod, stdout, ENOENT, background and network cases - Docs: platform matrix, limits (not a security boundary, Yama and background jobs) |
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WHC
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ef63f6d612 |
OpenCode-style TUI, model probing, sandboxed auto approval
- TUI: centered home screen with logo, boxed input with mode line, sidebar (>=120 cols), Ctrl+P palette, Tab Build/Plan, Shift+Tab approval cycle, mouse (cards, cursor, pickers, wheel), /sidebar /mouse /approval - /models probing: key check on entry (401 re-asks), API models in /model - Shell sandbox in C: Linux Landlock (writes limited to workspace/tmp, ABI>=4 blocks TCP), macOS sandbox_init, rules fallback elsewhere - Approval modes ask/auto/yolo (default auto); read-only command whitelist; ask to rerun outside the sandbox when a command looks blocked - Upgradable bootstrap scripts (git pull --ff-only, rebuild, reinstall) and cst-agent-update; cst-agent --version - tests: test_sandbox, test_models |