The engine can be embedded now instead of only driven from a terminal: the
same objects link into a Qt front end (app/) that owns a cst_agent_t inside
its own process -- no port, no token, no second process -- and that front end
now runs on the desktop and, engine-side, on the phone.
Capability metadata (include/cst_tools.h, src/tools/registry.c):
- cst_tool_def_t gains perm_name, platforms and available (a probe that
returns a reason), so a permission is addressable by name and a tool can
say why it cannot run here.
- cst_platform_name(), cst_tool_platform_ok(), cst_tool_available(),
cst_tool_meta_reload(), cst_tool_perm_name() and CST_PLAT_DESKTOP[].
- cst_tool_register() may take over a built-in name that is not runnable on
this platform, so a front end replaces it with its own implementation.
- the registry entries carry their class (delete_file -> "delete"), the
desktop clipboard tools carry a clipboard probe; find/active/run gate on it.
- /api/settings.tools[] exposes perm_name, platforms, available, why and the
declared parameters.
Engine as a library (Makefile, CMakeLists.txt):
- libcstcore.a from the CORE_OBJ set, and a CMake cstcore target shared by
the CLI and by app/ (-DCST_BUILD_APP=ON): the engine is compiled once.
- Android branch for the vendored sashidown: a per-ABI archive built with the
NDK's aarch64-linux-android24-clang wrapper, because CMake's compiler is
plain clang and keeps --target/--sysroot in its own variables.
Qt front end (app/, new):
- AgentCore wraps one cst_agent_t: turns run on a worker thread, every
cst_agent_hooks_t callback becomes a Qt signal, and the two hooks that need
an answer (on_permission, on_ask_user) block the worker until the GUI
replies; mode, approval and plan mode go through the engine's config.
- ToolProvider hands the front end's tools to the engine (owner "app:*"); the
Linux one is notification_send with a probe for notify-send/D-Bus.
- Main.qml: transcript, tool blocks, consent dialog (Deny/Once/Always ->
CST_PERM_*), ask_user, mode switch, Esc to cancel; --selftest stays
headless and runs the embedding checks without QML.
Android (scripts/, docs/android.md, new):
- scripts/build_third_party_android.sh builds static mbedTLS + libcurl for an
ABI (CA path /system/etc/security/cacerts); build_android.sh builds
cst-agent, libcstcore.a and the test binaries for the phone, can push them
and run the whole suite there.
- sandbox_exec.c keeps the plain exec path on Android: the seccomp supervisor
compiled in and the probe reported "seccomp", but writes outside the
workspace were not denied on the device -- claiming a sandbox that does not
hold is worse than reporting none.
- tests/test_diff.c compares layouts only against real GNU diffutils: toybox's
diff prints the same hunk header with its own hunk/context rules.
Tests: test_tool_meta (metadata, platform gate, probe reasons, takeover of a
built-in name) and test_embed (in-process embedding contract) are new; the
existing registry/llm_body assertions now follow availability. 38 test
binaries pass on the host, 36/36 on arm64-v8a Android 16, cst-app-selftest
passes in both the standalone app/ build and the repo build.
Version 0.8.7.
Landlock no longer handles TCP, the Seatbelt profile drops (deny network*),
and the seccomp filter stops refusing IPv4/IPv6 sockets. Sandboxed commands
run without asking in auto mode on every backend (Low-IL no longer asks for
network commands), and connection errors are not treated as sandbox blocks.
The sanitizers job wedged the only runner by printing AddressSanitizer
DEADLYSIGNAL forever (Docker without SYS_PTRACE). Concurrency now cancels
in-progress jobs on a new push, and make asan is wrapped in timeout -s KILL
480 with shallow ASAN_OPTIONS.
Also copy the path with memcpy after the length check so -O1 asan builds
do not warn about snprintf truncation into OS_PATH_MAX.
With Yama ptrace_scope=2 and no CAP_SYS_PTRACE, process_vm_readv and
/proc/<pid>/mem both fail, so sc_decide cannot read path strings and every
workspace write gets EACCES. The old probe only checked the USER_NOTIF
round trip, so CST_SANDBOX=seccomp and the forced-seccomp test pass looked
available and then failed on the first write.
sc_can_peek() forks a child, places a marker on its stack, and retries the
same sc_peek path. sc_probe() now needs that too, so those hosts fall back
to none (or keep landlock) instead of a silent deny-all sandbox.
Build
* cross build switches to pkgsCross.ucrt64 (shell-win.nix); curl (Schannel),
winpthreads and ncurses 6.6 are linked statically, so the release is
cst-agent.exe + busybox.exe (busybox-w32 Unicode) with no extra DLLs
* windres embeds a manifest with activeCodePage=UTF-8 and a version resource
* ncurses 6.6 Windows console driver patches (mouse button state, A_DIM,
wide-char declarations): scripts/patches/
* scripts/bootstrap_msys2.sh builds the same release natively in MSYS2
UCRT64; PR #1's MINGW64 notes now point there
* vendor/tre-regex (musl's TRE) provides <regex.h> on MinGW
UTF-8
* paths cross the system call boundary as UTF-16 (*W APIs); console code
pages set to 65001 and restored on exit; files are read and written in
binary mode
* child output that is not valid UTF-8 is decoded from the console, OEM or
ANSI system code page
* read_file hides CR; edit_file, apply_patch and write_file keep CRLF line
endings and a UTF-8 BOM
OS layer and processes
* os_dir_* and cst_fnmatch replace the POSIX-only directory walks in
subagent, plugins, skills, undo and fs_tools; realpath / path_under and
symlink rejection work on Windows
* every child goes through CreateProcessW with its own environment block
inside a Job Object, so timeouts and Esc end the whole process tree
Sandbox (auto mode, "auto · lowil")
* run_shell runs with a restricted Low integrity token; the workspace gets
an inheritable Low label once, the sandbox TEMP is labeled Low, and the
credentials file gets a no-read-up label
* drive roots, the profile and system folders are never labeled
* network commands still ask, since Low IL does not block the network;
Access denied and MSYS2's 0xc0000142 offer a rerun outside the sandbox
* /sandbox lists labeled folders, /sandbox reset-labels restores them
TUI
* raster console fonts are switched to Consolas / NSimSun while running
* the home logo falls back to text when the console font lacks U+2580
* mouse drag copy goes to the Windows clipboard
Distribution
* scripts/install_windows.ps1 installs a Gitea release into
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\cst-agent and adds it to the user PATH;
cst-agent-update.cmd reruns it; scripts/release_windows.sh uploads the
zip with the token taken from the environment
* scripts/run_windows.bat is gone; docs/README-windows.md is rewritten
Tests
* new test_lowil, test_win_utf8 and test_os_dir; tests made portable
(cst_test_util.h)
* scripts/win_test.sh and scripts/winvm/ run the suite on English and
Chinese Windows Server VMs as Administrator, a standard user and a
Chinese user name: 29/29 on all six
- Child installs a seccomp filter with a listener; a supervisor thread
resolves the path of write-type syscalls (cwd, dirfd, .., symlinks,
/proc/self, /dev/stdout, both ends of rename/link) and answers
CONTINUE or EACCES; IPv4/IPv6 sockets are refused
- Probe order Landlock -> seccomp -> none, checked in a throwaway child;
CST_SANDBOX=landlock|seccomp|off
- curl connect failures count as sandbox refusals
- test_sandbox runs the detected sandbox and forced seccomp, with escape,
symlink, rename, link, chmod, stdout, ENOENT, background and network cases
- Docs: platform matrix, limits (not a security boundary, Yama and
background jobs)
WHC